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The conundrum of stock versus bond prices
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Abstract In a general way, stock and bond prices do not display any significant correlation. Yet,
if we concentrate our attention on specific episodes marked by a crash followed by a rebound, then
we observe that stock prices have a strong connection with interest rates on the one hand, and with
bond yield spreads on the other hand. That second relationship is particularly stable in the course of
time having been observed for over 140 years. Throughout the paper we use a quasi-experimental
approach. By observing how markets respond to well-defined exogenous shocks (such as the shock
of September 11, 2001) we are able to determine how investors organize their “flight to safety”:
which safe haven they select, how long their collective panic lasts, and so on. As rebounds come to
an end the correlation of stock and bond prices fades away, a clear sign that the collective behavior
of investors loses some of its coherence; this observation can be used as an objective criterion for
assessing the end of a market rebound. Based on the behavior of investors, we introduce a distinction
between “genuine stock market rallies”, as opposed to spurious rallies such as those brought about by
the buyback programs implemented by large companies. The paper ends with a discussion of testable
predictions.
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1 Introduction
Stocks and bonds constitute the two main securities traded on stock exchanges. It is true that over
the last two decades other products such as futures and options have acquired an ever increased im-
portance; in a sense, however, one can consider that their main purpose is to provide hedging tools
for those “primary products” such as stocks, bonds, commodities, exchange rates and so on. It is
therefore a natural question, to ask whether there is a relationship between the prices of stocks and
bonds. The reason why we call this issue a conundrum will be readily understood by taking a look at
Fig.1 and 2. Let us comment them briefly (we will come back to them later on).
For bonds it is their yields rather than their prices which is usually recorded. The yield is the real (as
opposed to the coupon rate) interest rate brought by the bond; it is defined as the ratio of the coupon
rate to the bond’s price (for more detail see Appendix A). This means that over short time intervals
of the order of a few months during which the average coupon rate of a sample of bonds remains
approximately constant, the yield basically represents the inverse of the price. Figure 1 shows that for
three episodes marked by a stock price dip followed by a rebound, the yield of US Treasury bonds
closely follows the stock index; in each case the correlation is highly significant 1 . In other words,
prices of stocks and bonds move in opposite directions. How can we account for that observation? A
first explanation, one which may sound particularly appealing to physicists, is to say: let us assume
that the stock exchange is a closed system (which is not altogether absurd over short time spans) and
for the sake of simplicity let us discard all other products except stocks and bonds, then the stock
exchange would be fairly well described by a communicating vessel model in which the amount of
liquid represents the total amount of capital while the levels of the liquid would represent price levels.
In such a model if the level in vessel S goes up, the level in vessel B must go down, which is what
we observe. This argument can be fleshed out by remarking that investors usually respond to a sharp
drop in stock prices by a collective flight to safety, by which one means that investors are tempted
to sell all their risky assets and to seek refuge into non risky assets such as Treasury bills and bonds.
Subsequently, when the panic abates they will transfer back capital from bonds to stocks.
But these nice explanations, and especially the first one, do not hold very long if we bring in ad-
ditional evidence. If we focus our attention on the time interval from 1 June 1999 to 11 October
1999, instead of obtaining a positive correlation between stock prices and bond yields we get instead
a negative correlation equal to -0.56. Thus, the communication vessel model crumbles down. But we
can still hope to safe the flight to safety model. Indeed, as the above time interval does not contain
any crash-rebound episode, the flight to safety mechanism simply does not apply. The main problem
when trying to check this effect is to make sure that the evolution in yield indeed reflects the one in
price, in other words we ought to make sure that the average coupon rate of the set of bonds that one
considers remains constant. If one relaxes this constraint, then the connection between stock prices
and bond yields disappears completely. This is what happens if one considers a broad time interval,
as illustrated in Fig.2. The thin line gives the correlation of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index
and the Treasury yields. The average correlation is -0.25 but this figure has in fact little meaning since
the correlation fluctuates wildly. If we focus at the period 1969-1980 which was marked by several
stock price slides, we see that instead of being positive the correlation in fact is consistently negative.
Figure 2 also displays the correlation between stock prices and bond yield spreads. The spread can be
defined in several ways (see Appendix A); one of the most frequently used is the difference between
1The three correlations in Fig.1 are equal to 0.51, 0.68 and 0.75 respectively, which for n > 50 are of course highly
significant; subsequently, for the sake of simplicity, confidence intervals will be omitted except in those cases where they
matter that is to say for fairly weak correlations. We computed the correlations for the prices themselves; as no trend has
to be removed using price changes instead, would present no real advantage here; the main effect would be to increase the
noise component.
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Fig.1 Comparison of share prices and Treasury yields during three crashes on the New York
stock market. The three price falls occurred in the wake of the bull market of the 1990s. In order to facilitate
the comparison the stock index was normalized to 100 at the beginning of the crashes (left-hand scale); the
right-hand scale represents the yield of 10-year Treasury bonds in percent. All curves have been smoothed
through a 3-point moving window average. The data are weekly in case 1 and daily in cases 2 and 3. The
correlations for the three cases are 0.51, 0.68, 0.75 respectively which are highly significant as confirmed by
the following confidence intervals (0.27,0.69),(0.63,0.83),(0.44,0.73). Source: http://finance.yahoo.com.
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Fig.2: Correlation between stock prices and bond yields/spreads. The correlations were computed
using a moving window technique (width of the window was 41 months). The fact that they fluctuate wildly
shows that there is no stable relationship between stock prices and bond yields. Thin line: correlation with
10-year Treasury yields; thick line: opposite of the correlation of stock prices and the difference between the
yield of corporate bonds of Baa rating and 10-year Treasury yields. Dashed line: same as thick line except that
the 10-year Treasury yield is replaced by the yield of Aaa bonds, the highest quality in the range of corporate
bonds. Over the whole 1954-2003 time interval the correlations are -0.25, 0.29 and -0.26 respectively. Source:
http://economagic.com; http://finance.yahoo.com.
Baa rated bonds (a medium quality bond) and Treasury bonds. The more troubled the economic
situation, the less one would expect investors to invest in risky bonds, and therefore the higher the gap
between the yields of risky and non-risky bonds. In other words, the spread can be seen as a measure
of economic uncertainty perceived by investors, as was proposed in an earlier paper (Roehner 2000).
Naturally, one would expect economic uncertainty to increase dramatically in the wake of major stock
market crashes, in other words one would expect the spread to expand in times of falling stock prices.
A confirmation of this interpretation can be found in Fig.3: we see that the spread widens during stock
market crashes and narrows during the rebound; over this 7-month interval the correlation of stock
prices and spread is −0.85. One could expect that because it is a difference of yields the spread would
be less sensitive to variations in interest rates than the Treasury yield itself. Yet, Fig.2 shows that
it nevertheless has no stable relationship with stock prices as shown by the wild fluctuations of the
correlation. However the spread does a better job in that respect than the Treasury yield. For instance
even a short lived crash such as the one in October 1987 brings about a positive correlation (note that
in order to facilitate the comparison, the graph displays the opposite of the correlation). However the
fact that the overall correlation for the whole time interval does not have the right sign (it is equal
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Fig.3: Bond spread and stock prices. Solid line: Difference in the yields of Baa bonds and 10-year
Treasury bonds (left-hand scale); dashed line: Standard&Poor’s 500 index (right-hand scale, divided by 1,000).
Daily data; the correlation is 0.85. The two dots correspond to September 11. Source:http://economagic.com;
http://finance.yahoo.com.
to 0.29) shows that it only makes sense to study it if one restrict oneselves to selected crash-rebound
episodes.
This is something economists are reluctant to do. One reason for their unwillingness to focus on
specific episodes is probably due to the fact that if one accepts the assumption of a “rational homo
economicus” whose way of reasoning would be independent of any social Zeitgeist, it is difficult
to imagine that investors may react differently in an optimistic environment or in a time of panic2.
As a result the methodology commonly used in econometrics does not prove very pertinent for han-
dling problems of the kind considered in this paper. In standard econometric procedure, time series
are treated en bloc without any attempt to break them up into episodes corresponding to different
mechanisms; once the “en bloc” option has been adopted it makes little difference whether one uses
multivariate analysis or any other statistical tool for the data are spoiled from the start. A recent paper
by Gabe de Bondt (2002) is typical of this procedure. The author considers (en bloc) the three-year
time interval since the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and develops a multivariate analysis
with no less than 25 variables among which the corporate debt, price earnings ratio, corporate bond
spreads, industrial confidence indicator, etc. With such a catch-all set of variables one is not in the
best conditions for identifying and isolating a specific mechanism. In contrast, in a very stimulating
paper which is one of the few exceptions to the above procedure, Frederic Mishkin (1991) focuses on
a set of sharply defined banking panics.
2A more detailed analysis of this important point can be found in Roehner 2002 (chapter 3)
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The approach that we use in this paper consists in observing the response of the system to different
kind of shocks. In physics, the perturbations used in order to probe a system can be selected at will by
the experimentalist. Here, we are more in the situation of an astrophysicist who has to wait for a new
supernova to appear in order to use it as an observational probe. In the next section we study how the
system responded to a series of historical crashes. Then, in section 3, we take a close look at how it
reacted to the shock of September 11, 2001. In the next section we study the transition between the
crash-rebound regime and the more “normal” regime characterized by the absence of collective panic
reactions. Finally, in the last section we propose some testable predictions. We do not claim that our
study altogether solves the problem, but it provides a series of robust regularities which should be of
usefulness in future attempts to build mathematical models or simulations.
2 Response to historical stock market crashes
So far we have considered two variables: the interest rate of Treasury bonds and the spread of corpo-
rate bonds. By observing the response of the US market to a sequence of nine historical stock market
crashes, we will be able to determine which one of these variables has the most robust relationship
with stock prices. Fig.4 represents the correlation of stock prices and interest rates (triangles) or yield
spreads (circles). Obviously it is the spread which has the most robust relationship. As a matter of fact,
such a stable relationship over a time span of one century and a half is quite remarkable, especially on
account of the major institutional and organizational transformations that occurred at the New York
Stock Exchange during this time. Although less stable, the pattern displayed by the triangles is not
without interest. First, we see that there is an overall upward trend. Back in the nineteenth century, in-
terest rates experienced a jump during stock market crashes; in these times over-investment provoked
a dearth of capital (usually referred to as a credit crunch) which naturally lead to higher borrowing
prices. Apart from this trend the cases of 1929-1930 and 2001-2002 stand out as being characterized
by high positive correlations. These crashes were both preceded by a decade-long period of specu-
lative frenzy and in both cases interest rates were massively reduced by the Federal Reserve (which
had been created in 1913) in order to check the fall in stock prices (more details about the case of
1929-1930 can be found in Roehner 2001, p.186-188). For the sake of illustration Fig.5 compares
the evolution of stock prices, spread and interest rate for the episode that is currently under way. This
figure extends to 2003 the graphs displayed in Roehner (2000) for the eight earlier episodes. Table 1a
provides regression results for the nine episodes.
The fact that the average value of the coefficient a is approximately equal to minus one means than a
x percent drop in the spread would be accompanied by a x percent increase (x > 20) in stock prices
and vice versa. This is indeed what has been observed during the past nine months: between October
2002 and June 2003 (time of writing) the spread fell by 26 percent while the SP500 gained 22 percent.
Before we leave this section an observation is in order about the way we measure the interest rate
spread. As explained in Appendix A, it mainly depends upon the data that we have at our disposal;
certainly the best procedure is to calculate the coefficient of variation of the yields of a sufficiently
large set of individual bonds. This is the procedure used by Mishkin (1991) for the pre-1935 episodes
for which he could used Macaulay’s data (1938). The other option is to take the difference between
the yield of Baa bonds and of Treasury bonds. This procedure is used by Mishkin (1991) for the
episodes which occurred after 1950 and is the one that we used throughout this paper. However, it is
clearly less satisfactory than the estimate derived from individual bonds for at least two reasons.
• The decision to grade a bond as Baa is made by rating agencies. But these agencies can make
mistakes. An example was provided in December 2001 by the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation. Both
Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s kept Enron’s bonds at investment grade until just 5 days before it filed
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Fig.4: Correlation between stock prices and interest rates/spreads for nine historical episodes of
crashes. Triangles: correlation between stock prices (SP500) and the 10-year Treasury yield; the last triangle
has been drawn in white instead of black in order to show that this episode is not completely over. White
circles: correlation between the same stock index and the Baa-Treasury spread; the graph shows that for the
nine episodes this correlation is more stable than the first. Source: Roehner (2000).
for bankruptcy (Wall Street Journal, 28 March 2002); a similar episode happened on 19 September
2002 when the company Electronic Data System announced a drastic reduction in profits (which
provoked a fall of 53 percent of its share price) which took rating agencies completely by surprise;
after the announcement, they downgraded the company’s debt.
• By using the Baa-Treasury difference in fact, we discard the whole spectrum of low quality
bonds between Caa and Baa. These bonds are issued by companies which are usually smaller and
in a more difficult position; but precisely for these reasons, they would constitute a more sensible
barometer of the business climate. Using this more sensible indicator would perhaps permit to explain
away some of the outliers. Unfortunately, so far we were not able to find a comprehensive data set of
individual US corporate bonds.
3 The response of investors to greater uncertainty
The historical evidence reviewed in the previous section highlights a number of interesting facts. (i)
During crash-rebound episodes stock prices and spreads move in opposite directions; in percentage
terms each change of one variable is mirrored by an identical change of the other (ii) During the two
episodes of 1929 and 2001 the flight to security of investors was masked by the policy of the central
bank. Indeed such a flight would have resulted in an increase in treasury prices and thus a decrease in
their yields; but the Fed’s policy of lowering interest rates had of course essentially the same effect;
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Fig.5: Stock prices compared with Treasury yield and spread between start of slide and June
2003. Solid line: stock prices (normalized SP500 index), left-hand side scale. Thin broken line: 10-year
Treasury yield; thick broken line: Baa-Treasury spread, right-hand side scale in percent for both curves. The
correlations are indicated in the upper left corner. The graphic starts in August 2000 as indicated by the date
printed vertically along the y-axis. This figure parallels and continues the graphs given in Roehner (2000) for
eight former historical episodes. Source: http://economagic.com; http://finance.yahoo.com.
at this point we have no means which would enable us to disentangle these two effects3.
By observing the day-by-day response of investors to a shock we will be able to get a better under-
standing of how they react. More specifically, we will address two questions (i) Are the shift affecting
bonds always a consequence of what happens on the share market? (ii) What forms take the flight to
security?
Most often, in business news, moves affecting the bond market are seen as a result of changes in
stock prices; one would for instance find statements such as “Today Treasury forfeit previous gains
in wake of Dow’s advance”. Can we really take for granted this direction of causality? The shock of
September 11 gives us an opportunity to test this assumption. Because the stock market was closed
during a longer time interval than the bond market we can observe how bonds behave in the absence
of stock quotations (Fig.6). We observe that: (i) The 5.6 percent increase in the price of 10-year
Treasury bonds takes place on September 13-14 that is to say when the stock market was still closed.
(ii) The main part (11 percent out of a total shift of 18 percent) of the price fall of Baa corporate bonds
also occurred before the stock market reopened. In short we see that bond prices can make rapid and
3One might think that by focusing on a time interval during which there has been no reduction in the fed funds rate one
would be able to observe the other effect alone, but this is not completely right because the fed funds rate is a short-term
rate; the fact that it does not change does not necessarily mean that medium- and long-term rates remain unchanged as
well.
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Table 1a Relationship between interest rate spread and stock prices in historical crash episodes
in the United States over the time interval 1857-2003:
∆Spread/Spread = a (∆Stock price/Stock price) + b
Year Duration Amplitude a b Correlation
of fall
[month]
1 1857 15 0.60 −0.94± 0.4 −0.8± 3 −0.82
2 1873 15 0.80 −2.00 ± 1 0.2 ± 4 −0.78
3 1890 18 0.80 −0.82± 0.4 −0.8± 1 −0.74
4 1893 12 0.73 −1.70± 0.7 −3.7± 3 −0.84
5 1907 22 0.62 −1.00± 0.6 0.1 ± 3 −0.57
6 1931 44 0.18 −0.51± 0.3 3.0 ± 6 −0.62
7 1938 22 0.55 −0.75± 0.4 1.5 ± 4 −0.78
8 1987 10 0.70 −0.63± 0.6 −0.9± 5 −0.63
9 2002? 34? 0.55? −0.42± 0.3 −0.2± 2 −0.43
Average -0.98 ± 0.2 -0.20 ± 1 -0.69
Notes: The year refers to the trough of the stock price index. The amplitude of the fall is defined as the
ratio of the stock price index at the trough to its level at the peak. The cases considered for the period before
1990 are essentially those identified and enumerated in Mishkin (1991). All data are monthly. The variation
ratios ∆Spread/Spread and ∆Stock price/Stock price are defined in percent. The fact that the average of a is
approximately equal to -1 means that when the spread decreases by 26 percent (as was the case between the end
of 2002 and mid-2003 one may expect the SP500 to increase by 26 percent (in fact it increased by 22 percent).
Sources: Mishkin (1991); http://economagic.com; http://finance.yahoo.com
Table 1b Relationship between Treasury yields and stock prices in three crashes
in the United States over the time interval 1998-2003:
∆Stock price/Stock price = a (∆Yield/Yield) + b
Year Duration Amplitude a b Correlation
of fall
[month]
1 1998 11 0.84 0.19± 0.2 0.40 ± 0.7 0.25
2 2001 9 0.80 0.22± 0.3 −0.12 ± 1 0.25
3 2002 4 0.80 0.72± 0.5 0.04 ± 2 0.61
Average 0.38 ± 0.2 0.11 ± 0.7 0.37
Notes: The table focuses on the recurrent crashes (displayed in Fig.1) which occurred in the wake of the bull
market of the 1990s. For some reason (not well understood yet) these crashes differed from the other ones
(except 1929) listed in Table 1a by the fact that there was a significant positive correlation between the level of
stock prices and the yield of Treasury bonds. All data are weekly. The relative variations of stock prices and
yields are expressed in percent.
Source: http://finance.yahoo.com
substantial moves without being pulled by stock prices.
Moreover we see that the flight into long-term Treasury is about two times smaller than the withdrawal
from moderately risky Baa bonds. This conclusion is confirmed by the results given in Table 2 for
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Fig.6: Response of investors to the shock of September 11, 2001. From Sep.10 to its local maximum
around Sep.21, the spread increased by 18 percent, of which 11 percent occurred before the reopening of stock
quotations.. Source: http://economagic.com; http://finance.yahoo.com.
bonds quoted in Frankfurt.
While the withdrawal from Moody’s Baa2 (BBB in Standard and Poor’s notation) results in a modest
one percent price decrease, for the B1 to B3 range (Standard and Poor’s B+ to B-) the fall is about 6
percent.
If one looks at the change in constant maturity short-term Treasury bills (3 months to two years)
which are not represented on Fig.6 for the sake of clarity, we see that their prices jump by about 14
percent.
To sum up, two major conclusions emerge.
• Bond yields can move quickly and substantially without such moves having necessarily to be
triggered by shifts in share prices.
• What is usually referred to as a flight to safety in fact is more a flight away from risk. Investors
pull back from what they perceive as risky assets and transfer the money into secure short-term assets
such as Treasury bills where it will sit until eventually being retransfered to stocks in the rebound
phase.
The second point is confirmed by the observation of another shock. In the afternoon of Tuesday 25
June 2002, the direction of WorldCom, a major telecommunication company, announced that due to
a multibillion accounting fraud the company had to fill for bankruptcy. In the following week the
SP500 index fell by about 4 percent; however, for companies in the telecommunication sector the fall
in share prices was much more substantial. For Qwest it was 50 percent; for Lucent, 33 percent; for
Nortel, 23 percent; for IBM it was only 3 percent; for McDonald’s it was less than 2 percent. The
magnitude of the drop in fact provides an estimate of how distant the respective companies are from
10
Table 2 Response of bonds quoted in Germany to the shock of September 11, 2001
Baa2 bonds B1 to B3 bonds
WKN code Price change WKN code Price change
percent percent
610042 −1.1 352445 −3.9
308960 −1.0 353764 −3.1
352942 −1.3 230637 −9.6
610260 −1.0 108565 −5.3
677682 −0.8 614414 −9.1
Average -1.0 -6.0
Notes: Baa2 bonds are the lower end of the so-called investment-grade bonds; B1 to B3 bonds belong to the
high-risk spectrum; these grades are just one notch above the Caa grade which designates bonds which are
close to default. It is known that the reaction of bond prices to changes in interest rates depends upon the times
left to maturity. Here, however, the shock was not primarily a change in interest rates; nevertheless, we tried to
control for a possible effect of this kind by selecting (as far as available) two sets of bonds with similar average
maturity dates.
Sources: http://www.finanztreff.de; http://www.bondboard.de (bond finder).
the telecommunication sector. What happened to bonds? The price of Baa bonds dropped by 1.8
percent while the price of Treasury bonds increased by 0.4 percent.
At this point the reader may wonder whether it is possible to determine the direction of causality
between spread and stock prices by using statistical methods in the spirit of Granger’s causality tests.
To this aim, we compute the correlation function of the spread and stock prices by introducing a
varying time lag between the two series. The rationale of such a procedure is as follows: if the
correlation is found to be maximum for the bond series lagging behind the stock prices, one would
have good reason to think that the movements of the stock are the “cause” from which changes in
bonds derive. We performed this test on the daily yield series from 1 July 2001 to 28 February 2002.
The results are summarized in table 3.
We see that the maximum of the correlation occurs for d = −2 which corresponds to the spread
lagging two days behind stock prices. However this test is not completely satisfactory for two reasons
(i) the maximum is fairly soft (ii) the position of the maximum is not robust with respect to a reduction
in the length of the time interval (column 3 of table 3). In conclusion we can say that the test is
consistent with changes in the two series occurring almost on the same day. Furthermore one cannot
exclude that under a given set of circumstances the bonds drive the stocks while under different
conditions the stocks drive the bonds. As an image consider the case of a person who walks his dog;
in normal circumstances the dog follows its master, but if it spots another dog nearby, the situation
may well get reversed!
4 When the connection between stocks and bonds fades away
The conundrum evoked in the title of the paper refers to the startling difference between crash-rebound
episodes and long-term behavior. The former is marked by a strong connection between stock and
bond prices whereas over the long-term there seems to be no connection at all. In this section we study
more closely the transition between these two regimes. To this aim we use again the moving window
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Table 3 Correlation (with time lag d) of spread and stock prices: Cor[Spread(i),SP500(i+d)]
Time lag Correlation Correlation
[days] (160-day interval) (70-day interval)
−6 −0.800 −0.881
−4 −0.828 −0.923
−2 − 0.852∗ −0.949
0 −0.847 − 0.954∗
2 −0.783 −0.906
4 −0.697 −0.826
6 −0.610 −0.734
Notes: The series in the second column covers the interval from 1 July 2001 to 28 February 2002; the series
in the third column covers the time interval from 1 July 2001 to 12 October 2001. Both time intervals were
marked first by a drop in stock prices in the weeks preceding and following September 11, and then by a
rebound. The asterisks denote the time lags for which the absolute value of the correlation is largest.
technique already used in Fig.2 but in a slightly different form. We start with a time interval marked
by a strong connection between stock and bond prices and we then progressively expand this interval
by allowing its right-hand boundary to shift toward 24 May 1999. The result is summarized in Fig.7.
The time interval is centered around the crash of August-September 1998; we selected this crash
because in this case the rebound was followed by a long period of stock price increase (in contrast,
after 2000, crashes occurred in short succession). As the time interval is progressively widened the
two correlations first remain constant, then began to fall about 30 business days (i.e. 40 calendar days)
after the trough of the crash; at about 60 days (i.e. 2.6 calendar months) the correlations are reduced
to the point of being no longer significant. Yet, if we look at Fig.1a it is difficult to see any difference
in the way stock prices progressed. The fact that until the end of November 1998 the increase was
in fact a rebound and after that date gave way to the continuation of the bull market is by no means
apparent on the graph of the SP500; nonetheless there was a drastic, hidden change in the behavior of
investors.
5 Concluding comments
There are much closer ties between the stock and bond markets than for instance between the stock
and housing markets if only because there are securities which provide links between them: for in-
stance preferred stocks (see Appendix A), despite their name, share many attributes of bonds, and
convertible bonds (see Appendix A) can be transformed into stocks under pre-determined condi-
tions. Therefore the question of the connection between stock and bond prices is both a natural and
important one. We have shown that there is a strong connection between stocks and bonds during
crash-rebound episodes. Immediately after the crash, investors sell their risky bonds; the more risky,
the more they sell them (Table 2); after the rebound they sell some of their Treasuries and buy back
stocks as well and some of the more risky bonds (Fig.1 and 3). Subsequently, the collective behavior
of investors becomes less coherent and as other factors (such as for instance changes in interest rates)
take over, the strong connection between stocks and bonds fades away (Fig.7).
We would like to address three additional points which may be of interest in the perspective of future
work on this issue.
• First, why did we restrict this study to US data? Two other possible candidates would be
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Fig.7: The correlation between either yield or spread fades away in the course of time after the
crash. The decreasing correlation clearly points to a drastic change in the behavior of investors; it can be
interpreted as a shift away from the collective flight to safety reaction that prevailed during and shortly after the
crash. The graph refers to the crash of August 1998 (Fig.1a).
Europe and Japan. Europe has an important and fairly liquid Eurobond market, however European
stock markets very much move in the shadow of Wall Street, a circumstance which is likely to bias
the analysis. The Tokyo stock market is more independent from New York, but the domestic Japanese
bond market lacks liquidity, especially in the range of medium and low grade bonds. As a matter of
fact, it is because of this lack of liquidity that spread data were not published until 1997. Even after
this date, daily spread data have fairly large error bars due to the small number of transactions in low
grade bonds; whereas in 2000 the turn over (i.e. the ratio of trading volume to capitalization) of the
corporate bond market reached 0.81 in the United States, it was equal to 0.16 in Japan (Hattori et al.
2001). Incidentally, the relative under-development of the Japanese bond market has had important
consequences during the banking crisis of 1991-2003; their main assets were stocks and debt of
companies, but after stocks had crashed and the financial situation of the companies had deteriorated,
there was no junkbond market on which this bad debt could be sold; as a result it remained as a
millstone around their necks for over a decade.
• Common opinion holds that by lowering short term interest rates the central bank is able to
boost stock prices. However, from the regularities found in this paper, one could as well made a
case for the opposite to be true. The argument would go as follows. When the Federal Open Market
Committee lowers the fed funds rate, all existing bonds (which were issued in an environment of
higher rates) become more attractive to investors. Consequently their price will climb while their
yield will fall. If this happens in the context of a crash-rebound episode, we know (Fig.1) that it
should be accompanied by a concomitant fall in stock prices. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that
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cuts in the fed funds rate in fact depress stock prices. What makes this reasoning shaky is the fact that
it ignores time lags. As Fig.8 shows, the decisions of the Fed follow the fluctuations of short-term
interest rates rather than they provoke them. Seen in this light, the argument sounds more reasonable.
As a matter of fact, a “true” stock market rally should be characterized by a transfer of capital from
secure assets such as Treasuries to stocks. In contrast, a rally which occurs amidst increasing Treasury
prices is an anomaly. This was the situation between March and June 2003 (time of writing); in such
a case it seems safe to predict that either Treasury prices will stop increasing or stock will resume
their slide4.
Predictions
Ultimately the best way to test models or to check the validity of new regularities is to propose testable
predictions. It is probably no coincidence that this “experimental” procedure has been pioneered by
econophysicists. Marcel Ausloos, Anders Johansen, Didier Sornette and Nicolas Vandewalle were
among the first to test their models through predictions (see Vandewalle et al. 1998, Johansen et al.
1999, Sornette 2002). Naturally, the difficulty of the task strongly depends on whether one considers
short-, medium- or long-term predictions. For stock price predictions on very short time scales (of
the order of one minute or less) the order book constitute a good guide (see Maslov 2001). The main
difficulty when making predictions over very long time scales of the order of fifty years or more (see
Sornette 2002, p.373) is that its horizon may extend beyond the life time of the model.
As we already noticed the spread can hardly provide a predictor for stock prices. As a matter of fact,
short-term prediction of stock prices is probably impossible anyway for at least two reasons. Firstly
because the market is efficient, a somewhat fuzzy notion which one can understand in the sense that a
multitude of financial analysts track down any short-term predictor in order to exploit it. The second
reason is quite different. As is well known, big companies run massive buyback programs of their
own shares. As an estimate of their magnitude it is sufficient to recall that between 1996 and mid-
2003 buyback programs represented $ 1.3 trillion, that is to say about 13 percent of the capitalization
of the NYSE market at its peak in 2000. Although these programs are announced in advance, their
timing and the way they are going to be implemented are not; as a matter of fact, some are never
implemented and are announced merely to reassure stock holders. Because they are so massive these
buybacks may generate “spurious” rallies which of course are impossible to predict. As another fairly
exogenous source of spurious rallies, one can mention the merger and acquisitions which strongly
increase the demand for stocks but are the result of strategic decisions made by big companies rather
than the consequence of the moves made by individual investors. The Toronto stock market offered a
spectacular illustration of this effect over the decade 1991-2000 when merger and acquisitions were
multiplied by a factor 10, before abruptly declining in 2001 and 2002 (Security Industry 2002). 5
However, a buyback rally is unlikely to deeply change the behavior of investors which means that one
can distinguish between genuine and spurious rally by looking at the changes in bond prices and bond
spreads. If both prices and spreads drop the rally may be genuine.
This was for instance the case of the rally that followed the crash of mid-September 2001; unfor-
tunately it did not last very long; basically it began to fizzle out when stocks had regained their
4The same scenario occurred in August 2002: the SP500 gained 20 percent while the yield of the 10-year Treasury
dropped by 13 percent. This rally proved short-lived and was followed by a 20 percent slide between late August and
mid-October 2002. Then in the last two weeks of October there was a new rally, this time accompanied by a drop in
Treasury prices (a good omen), but also by an increase in the spread (see Fig.5) which was a less favorable portent.
5When it comes to short-term predictions about individual stocks the behavior of the chairman may become a crucial
factor. For instance, Sanford I. Weill, the chairman of Citigroup, exercised the right to sell stock options (for more than
half a million shares in each case) on 4 November 2001, 4 November 2002 and 17 June 2003 (http://finance. yahoo.com,
section: Citigroup - Insider); Citigroup’s stock price peaked on the first two of these dates, it will be interesting to see
whether 17 June 2003 will also represent a local maximum. In this connection it should be remembered that Citigroup
owns 10 percent at least of its stock and has run massive buyback programs over the recent years.
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pre-September 11 level. Looking further into the past, the rally which followed the crash of late Au-
gust 1998 was accompanied by a drop in the spread and an increase in Treasury yields in spite of a
cut in the fed funds rate. Thus, it clearly qualified as genuine. After February 2000 the spread began
to widen very quickly bringing the genuine rally to an end. However the market stayed on its stride
for a while and the downturn of the S&P500 occurred only in August 2000.
Finally, it must be emphasized that one can of course hardly expect completely deterministic connec-
tions in such a complex system; it is virtually impossible to control for all the variables that we did not
consider directly but which may nevertheless play a role in specific circumstances. Fig.2 conveys a
feeling of this complexity. Whereas the stock market is only mildly dependent upon interest rates, the
bond market has a very strong connection with them, and through these rates it is closely connected
to the “real economy” (probably to a greater degree than the stock market itself). Our main objective
in this paper was to scrutinize the behavior of investors during episodes marked by a sharp increase
in overall uncertainty and to find regularities in their reactions. Further progress will become possible
if we can find a comprehensive data set of individual US corporate bonds.
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A Appendix A: Some basic facts about bond markets
This appendix has three purposes. First we recall a few salient facts about the bond market, then we
highlight its similitudes with the stock market and finally we describe some recent developments.
First of all one should recall the basic mechanism which governs the price of bonds. Suppose for
instance that a 10-year government bond was issued by the US Treasury in 1998 with a (fixed) interest
rate of 5 percent which in bond parlance is also called its coupon rate. Suppose further that, because
there has been a general decline in interest rates, the coupon rate of this type of bond is 4 percent in
2003; then, at least theoretically, there will be an extra demand for this older bond with a 5 percent
coupon rate that would cause its price to rise until the ratio of the coupon rate to the current price (this
ratio is called the current yield, see more details below) would be the same 4 percent. In the present
case this means that the price would increase from its initial level of 100 to 100 times 5/4 that is to
say 125.
As another example, consider a company that issues two different bonds at the same moment. If their
durations are not the same their coupon rates are also likely to be different. Once they are on the
market, their prices will adjust in the course of time so that their yields become fairly equal to those
of other bonds of same duration and same quality (see more about quality below) that are already on
the market.
Having explained the basic mechanism, let us now state some of the definitions which are used
throughout this paper.
• The current yield of a bond is defined as the ratio of coupon rate to bond price. By the way, it
can be observed that bond prices are always close to the coupon price which by convention is taken
as equal to 1 or 100 (depending on the convention), except for bonds which are close to default. The
yield to maturity6 refers to the total revenue gained from the bond; its computation is more involved
because one has to take into account the present value of all subsequent coupons. Usually, however,
the current yield and the yield to maturity vary in the same direction; at a qualitative level the two
notions can be used without further distinction.
• Bonds are rated by rating agencies on a scale which comprises two main classes: the investment
grade class which goes from Aaa to Baa in Moody’s notation and the high-yield (also called junk
bond) class which goes from Baa to Caa (a Caa grade means that the bond is close to default) 7 . The
high-yield market first came into existence as a fairly liquid market in the United States in the early
1980s; in some other developed countries such as for instance Japan this market is still fairly narrow
and illiquid.
Because there is a broad spectrum of grades, a natural question is to ask how yields depend upon
grades. Basically, the lower the grade, the higher the yield. This leads to the notion of spread.
Depending on the data that are available the spread can be defined in various ways. If data for a
large sample of individual bonds are available the spread can be defined as the (ensemble) standard
deviation of the yields. If only average yield data are available the spread can be defined as the
difference between the yield of Baa bonds and the yield of Treasury bonds. Note that although the
Aaa grade designates the highest quality of bonds, Treasury bonds usually are priced higher than
Aaa corporate bonds (for a same coupon rate). This premium is due to several factors which make
Treasuries more attractive to investors. For instance, if advantageous to the company, an Aaa bond
may be reimbursed before maturity date, a feature which introduces additional uncertainty for its
6Note that in Japan this notion is used with a slightly different meaning. Whereas in the West, the calculation assumes
that the coupon payments are reinvested, in Japan interest is not compounded; this slightly different notion is referred to
as the simple yield (Padua 1998).
7Here is the whole list of Moody’s grades: Aaa, Aa1-Aa2-Aa3, A1-A2-A3, Baa1-Baa2-Baa3, Ba1-Ba2-Ba3, B1-B2-
B3, Caa.
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owners.
When a publicly traded company wants to get financing it has three options: (i) apply for a bank
loan (ii) issue and sell a bond (iii) issue and sell new stock. Once issued and sold to investors, bonds
become fairly similar to shares in the sense that they can be sold and bought and that their price will
fluctuate in the course of time. There are however three major differences (i) Year after year, the bond
owner is assured to get a fixed interest rate, the so-called coupon rate. This is why bonds are called
fixed income securities. (ii) At a predetermined date (the so-called maturity date) the bond owner
will be reimbursed the face value of the bond. (iii) When the company fills for bankruptcy, usually
holders of common stocks lose everything, while bond holders may be able to get at least part of
their money back. In short, bonds provide predetermined, regular and secure flows of income a factor
which probably explains that bond prices are much less volatile than stock prices. When a bond is
close to its maturity its volatility almost drops to zero as the actual price of the bonds tends toward its
face value.
The factor considered as the major determinant of bond prices is the interest rate. However, as we
have seen in this paper, bond prices are also affected by many other factors and in particular by the
situation of the stock market.
Interest rates which so to say represent the price of money, are crucial (albeit intricate) economic vari-
ables which like any other prices are ultimately determined by supply and demand. This observation
is of little practical interest however for both the supply and the demand are in fact largely unknown
(and probably are not even well defined). At the short-term end of the spectrum one important factor
is the policy of the central bank. For instance in the United States, the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee meets eight times a year in order to set the level of the target for the federal funds rate, a rate which
is used for overnight loans to financial institutions. Since in this paper we mostly used the benchmark
of the 10-year Treasury bonds it is natural to wonder how this rate is related to the fed funds rate. Fig.
8 provides a comparison. Although there is a close relationship at the overall level of yearly rates,
on shorter time scales it is not obvious how long term rates derive from short-term rates. Fig.8 also
emphasizes that the decision of the FOMC follow the changes in short-term yields brought about by
the market rather than determining them, a feature often overlooked in financial commentaries.
There is no rigid separation between bonds and stocks. On the one hand, preferred stocks are similar
to bonds in the sense that they carry no right to vote and in the event of a default their standing is
closer to that of bonds; on the other hand, convertible bonds can be transformed into stocks under
pre-defined conditions. Convertible bonds are in fact very similar to common stocks in the event
of a default. They are usually issued by companies who would be unable to sell normal bonds; the
convertibility provides a kind of bonus which may attract investors especially during stock market
rallies. In May 2003 convertible bond issues represented $ 14 billion, an amount which is of the same
order of magnitude as monthly buybacks. That the linkage between stocks and bonds is much stronger
than for instance the one between stocks and real estate is shown by the fact that one cannot buy a
property which would be convertible into stocks (of course there are real estate investment stocks, the
so-called REIT, but that is purely a stock market affair).
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Fig.8: Short-term and long-term interest rates in the United States. The fed funds rate is a short-term
rate that is set periodically during the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee. It can be seen that these
decisions in fact follow the changes in the yield of 3-month Treasury bills. Source: http://www.dallasfed.org;
http://economagic.com.
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